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 NOTE
 STATE RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID COVERAGE OF
 MEDICALLY NECESSARY SERVICES
 INTRODUCTION
 The Medicaid program, title XIX of the Social Security Act,' was
 enacted in 1965 to provide partial federal funding of the costs of medical
 services for the indigent.2 Medicaid is a program of "cooperative federalism"
 -it is administered by the states, subject to certain federal requirements,
 and its costs are shared by the federal and state governments. Each par-
 ticipating state3 must adopt a Medicaid plan4 detailing the services that will
 be funded.5 The statute requires that state plans cover five general cate-
 gories of medical services,6 and permits coverage of several other categories,'
 but does not specify any items or procedures that must be included within
 any of these service categories.
 Dramatic, unanticipated cost increases and problems of fraud and abuse"
 1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified in
 amended form at 42 U.S.C. ? 1396 (1976)). All references will be to the codification.
 2. The program was a response to widespread problems of poor quality and low avail-
 ability of medical services for the indigent. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-76,
 reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 2014-15 [hereinafter cited as 1965
 S. REP.].
 Title XIX consolidated and liberalized existing federal health care assistance programs
 scattered throughout the Social Security Act. Consequently, Congress anticipated that Medi-
 caid would have a limited social impact, and would cost the federal government no more
 than an additional $200 million in its first year of operation. Id. at 85. See generally R.B.
 STEVENS & R STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 19-56 (1974).
 3. All states except Arizona currently offer Medicaid assistance. For the scope of coverage
 in each state, see [1977] 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ?? 15,500-15,660.
 4. 42 U.S.C.A. ? 1396a(a) (1)-(40) (West 1974 & Supp. 1978), sets forth the required
 components of a state Medicaid plan.
 5. The plan must also specify the individuals who will be eligible for benefits. In this
 regard, the plan must provide
 for making medical assistance available to all individuals receiving aid or assistance
 under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I [Old Age Assistance], X
 [Aid to the Blind], XIV [Aid to the Disabled], XVI [Supplemental Security Income],
 or part A of subchapter IV [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] of this
 chapter ....
 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (10) (A) (1976), and may provide assistance to the "medically needy"-
 those who do not qualify for public assistance yet cannot afford the costs of necessary medical
 care. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (10) (C) (1976).
 6. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (13) (B) (1976). The mandatory coverage categories are set forth
 at 42 U.S.C. ? 1396d(a) (1)-(5): (1) inpatient hospital services; (2) outpatient hospital and
 rural health clinic services; (3) laboratory and x-ray services; (4) skilled nursing facility
 services, family planning services, and early and periodic screening and diagnostic service for
 individuals under 21; and (5) physicians' services.
 7. At their option, states may include coverage for such service categories as: home health
 care; private duty nursing services; clinic services; dental services; prescription drugs and eye-
 glasses; rehabilitative services; physical therapy; and inpatient psychiatric services for individuals
 under 21. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396d(a)(7)-(16) (1976).
 8. See S. REP. No. 222, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. &
 AD. NEWS 1077, 1078; H. R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [1972]
 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4989. See generally R. B. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 2.
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 have led to state efforts to limit the scope of Medicaid coverage.9 These
 limitations include restrictions on the number of Medicaid-funded inpatient
 days, curtailment of the scope of different services within general categories,
 absolute exclusion of benefits for certain operations, and prohibitions on
 benefits for all abortions except those necessary to preserve a woman's life.10
 Challenges to these state coverage restrictions have called into question
 the extent of a state's discretion to define and limit its Medicaid program.
 Specifically, it has been contended that states must provide benefits for all
 "medically necessary" care." Although the statute provides no direct guid-
 ance on this question,'2 it may nonetheless implicitly require that certain
 items or procedures be covered in a state's plan. Such implicit requirements
 can only be ascertained through careful analysis of the Medicaid scheme.
 This Note first will examine Medicaid's statutory scheme as it relates
 to state discretion to impose restrictions on Medicaid coverage. The con-
 cept of "medically necessary" will then be defined, and its relevance to the
 question of state discretion examined. Finally, this Note will turn to specific
 restrictions that have been imposed by different states and analyze their
 validity within the statutory scheme.
 I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
 A state Medicaid plan must conform to certain general federal require-
 ments embodied in title XIX '3 and the accompanying HEW regulations.14
 Since title XIX does not specify which items or procedures a plan must in-
 clude, any argument that a state is required to fund a particular type of care
 must be drawn from these general federal requirements.
 The preamble to the Medicaid statute, section 1396, imposes no direct
 requirements on the states but is nonetheless highly relevant because it sets
 forth the general purpose of the statute. This section authorizes appropria-
 tions "[f]or the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under
 the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf
 9. Congress has also amended title XIX in order to impose limitations aimed at controlling
 the cost of Medicaid. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972 Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit.
 II, 86 Stat. 1329 (authorizing premium payments for the "medically needy," and cost-sharing
 by recipients for optional service categories); Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L.
 No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (placing an upper limit on the amount of income that can qualify an
 individual as "medically needy").
 10. See notes 100-67 and accompanying text infra. For other examples of limitations
 imposed by state plans, see [1977] 2 MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ?? 15,500-15,660.
 11. Compare Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom.
 Rush v. Poythress No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978), and Zbaraz v. Quern, [1978 Transfer
 Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ? 29,001 (N.D. IlL May 15, 1978) (title XIX
 requires states to fund all medically necessary services), with Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No.
 78-1324 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979), and, Virginia Hosp. Ass'n. v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781
 (E.D. Va. 1977) (holding that states may exclude benefits for some medically necessary care).
 12. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
 13. See note 4 supra.
 14. HEW regulations are promulgated under the authority granted by 42 U.S.C. ? 1302
 (1976), and have the force of federal law upon the states. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
 317 (1968); Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Sargent, 397 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (D. Mass. 1975).
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 of . .. individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
 costs of necessary medical services . . . .". 1 While the preamble does not
 define the type of "medical assistance" for which appropriations are
 authorized,' it does describe the intended beneficiaries as persons who can-
 not afford "necessary medical services." Since the statute was enacted to
 meet the medical needs of these persons, the purpose of the statute arguably
 would be defeated unless participating states were required to provide neces-
 sary medical care.'7 Any requirement that all necessary services be funded,
 however, apparently need only be met to the extent "practicable under the
 conditions in [each] state."
 Section 1396a(a) (17) of the statute authorizes each state to set its own
 standards for determining the extent of medical assistance offered under its
 Medicaid plan.'8 This discretion to expand or restrict coverage within
 service categories, however, is limited by a requirement that standards must
 be "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives" of title XIX.19 Because
 of this language, a plan's coverage-and thus any specific coverage limita-
 tions-must be reviewed for reasonableness.20
 The HEW regulation implementing section 1396a(a) (17)21 further de-
 fines the limitation of reasonableness placed on a state's discretion to estab-
 lish coverage standards. The amount, duration, and scope of services covered
 by the state plan must be sufficient "to reasonably achieve the purpose" of
 each item of medical care. Moreover, standards that arbitrarily restrict cov-
 erage solely because of the type of illness or condition are prohibited. The
 regulation also suggests that coverage restrictions based on the criterion of
 medical necessity would be appropriate.
 Other elements of title XIX, while not specifically addressed to state
 discretion to set coverage standards, are also relevant to the question of what
 a state must include in its plan. Section 1396a(a) (19) requires states to
 provide safeguards so that care will be provided in a manner consistent with
 15. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396 (1976).
 16. Id. ? 1396d(a) (1976) defines "medical assistance" in terms of general service cate-
 gories, see notes 6-7 supra, but contains neither an enumeration of the items and procedures
 to be funded nor the phrase "necessary medical services." The Court of Appeals for the
 First Circuit was the first court to recognize the structural significance of this fact. See
 Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No. 78-1324, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
 17. Cf. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mulligan, J., dissenting)
 ("necessary" implicitly modifies "medical assistance," indicating states may not fund elective
 procedures). See note 69 infra.
 18. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (17) (1976).
 19. Id. This section provides, in part, that a state plan must "include reasonable stand-
 ards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan
 which ... are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter....
 20. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
 21. 42 C.F.R. ? 449.10(a) (5) (i) (1977), which provides that a state plan must:
 Specify the amount and/or duration of each item of medical and remedial care and
 services that will be provided. . . . Such items must be sufficient in amount, duration
 and scope to reasonably achieve their purpose. . . . [T]he state may not arbitrarily
 deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of, such services . . . solely because
 of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition. Appropriate limits may be placed on
 services based on such criteria as medical necessity or those contained in utilization
 or medical review procedures.
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 the best interests of Medicaid recipients.22 This section arguably can be
 read to require states to cover all medically necessary care, because any re-
 striction on the funding of such care would not be in the best interests of all
 individual Medicaid patients.23 States are also required under section 1396a
 (a) (30)-(31) of the statute to establish "utilization" review procedures
 to examine the necessity of items of medical care contained in claims for
 reimbursement.24 This requirement is intended to discourage improper or
 excessive use of health care services,25 and suggests that states may exclude
 coverage for unnecessary medical care.26
 The statutory sections set forth above must be read in light of two
 major amendments to title XIX that have increased each state's control over
 the content of its plan. Section 1903(e) of the original statute required
 states to broaden the scope of covered services so that all eligible individuals
 would receive comprehensive medical care by 1977.27 HEW defined com-
 prehensive care to include all goods and services ordered by a physician
 within the scope of his practice.28 During the late 1960's and early 1970's,
 however, medical care costs rose at an unprecedented rate, and the compre-
 hensive coverage requirement of section 1903(e) threatened to impose a
 staggering financial burden on the states.29 Congress concluded that the
 22. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (19) (1976), which provides that a state plan must "provide
 such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care and services under the
 plan will be determined, and such care and services will be provided, in a manner consistent
 with simplicity of administration and the best interests of the recipients."
 23. This argument was implicitly accepted by the court in Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp.
 383, 386, 388 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom. Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th
 Cir. Apr. 1978). See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Interim Relief at 13-14, Right to Choose
 v. Byrne, No. C-3817-77 (N. J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Jan. 10, 1979). But see Virginia Hosp.
 Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Va. 1977). The argument, however, is seriously
 undercut by the legislative history. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
 24. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a)(30)-(31) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. ?? 1320c-1 to -19 (1976)
 (establishing Professional Standards Review Organizations), discussed in Gosfield, Medical
 Necessity in Medicare and Medicaid: The Implications of Professional Standards Review
 Organizations, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 229 (1978).
 25. For Congress's original intentions in enacting utilization review, see generally S. REP.
 No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Gosfield, supra note 24.
 26. Professor Gosfield argues that if a Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO)
 determines that an item of care is "medically necessary," that item will automatically be
 funded-thus, states are required to fund all medically necessary services. Gosfield, supra
 note 24, at 270-80. The existence of PSROs does not resolve the question, however, because
 those bodies can only operate within the ambit of a state Medicaid plan. If the plan excludes
 abortions, for example, a PSRO would not be called upon to review the medical necessity of
 abortions, because they would not be funded under state law. The exclusion might nonetheless
 be invalid as inconsistent with the federal requirements imposed by title XIX.
 27. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, ? 1903(e), 79 Stat. 286
 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. ? 1396b(e) (1970)) provided that:
 The Secretary shall not make payments . . . to any State unless the State makes
 a satisfactory showing that it is making efforts in the direction of broadening the scope
 of the care and services made available under the plan and in the direction of liberaliz-
 ing the eligibility requirements for medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing
 by July 1, 1977, comprehensive care and services to substantially all individuals who
 meet the plan's eligibility standards with respect to income and resources . . ..
 28. S. REP. No. 222, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
 NEws at 1081.
 29. Id.
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 requirement was no longer practicable,30 and repealed section 1903(e) in
 1972.31
 The original Medicaid statute also contained section 1902(d), which
 prohibited a state from reducing the extent of care and services provided
 under its plan if the restriction would cause a reduction in the total state
 Medicaid expenditure from one year to the next.32 This maintenance of
 effort requirement inhibited states from making significant reductions in the
 scope and extent of their plans' coverage.33 Congress concluded that this
 restrictive effect of section 1902(d) could, in some instances, impose im-
 practicable fiscal demands on the states.34 Thus, this section was also
 in 1972.-3
 Both of these amendments to title XIX reflect congressional concern
 for state fiscal interests, and both expanded state discretion to limit Medi-
 caid coverage. The current statutory scheme gives states considerable free-
 dom to define and restrict their Medicaid programs: the most specific limita-
 tion on this state discretion is the requirement that any restriction be reason-
 able and consistent with the program's objectives. This Note will next
 examine whether this limitation, in conjunction with the other relevant statu-
 tory elements, can be read to require states to fund all medically necessary
 services.
 II. MEDICAL NECESSITY
 The debate over a state's ability to restrict coverage for medically
 necessary care has intensified since the 1977 Supreme Court decision in
 Beal v. Doe.36 Beal upheld a Pennsylvania regulation limiting Medicaid
 funding to medically necessary abortions37 as consistent with title XIX. The
 Court asserted that state discretion under the statute to adopt coverage
 standards 38 included the ability to limit funding for purely elective treat-
 ment. Even within the mandatory service categories, therefore, states were
 not required to fund every procedure since some such procedures are elec-
 tive.39 The only limit on this broad discretion, in the Court's view, was the
 requirement of section 1396a(a)(17)40 that standards be reasonable and
 30. Id.
 31. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, ? 230, 86 Stat. 1329
 (1972).
 32. Act of Aug. 9, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-56, ? 2(d), 83 Stat. 99 (originally codified at
 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(d) (1970)).
 33. H.R. REP. No. 231, supra note 8, at 5086-87.
 34. Id.
 35. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, ? 231, 86 Stat. 1329.
 36. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
 37. Abortions were defined as medically necessary if the health of the woman was
 threatened, if there was a probability of a deformed or mentally deficient fetus, or if the
 woman's mental or physical health would be threatened by the continuance of a pregnancy
 resulting from rape or incest. Id. at 441 n.3.
 38. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (17) (1976). See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
 39. 432 U.S. at 444-45.
 40. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
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 consistent with the objectives of title XIX.41 Thus, if a state can offer a
 strong interest to justify a coverage restriction, the standard will be presumed
 reasonable.42 Pennsylvania's regulation, justified by the state's interest in
 encouraging normal childbirth,43 was held to meet this test.
 A. The Definition of "Medically Necessary"
 The Court did not define "medically necessary care" in Beal because
 the only issue raised in that case was the validity of a restriction on funding
 non-necessary care. Moreover, Congress did not define the statutory term
 "necessary medical services" 44 -neither title XIX itself nor the legislative
 history contains any definition. To determine whether the "medical necessity"
 of a given item or procedure restricts a state's freedom to limit funding for
 it, however, a definition of "medically necessary" that is appropriate in the
 funding context must be formulated.
 1. Judicial Approaches. The definition most often advanced is the
 standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton.45 In one branch
 of the case, the Court considered whether a state statute proscribing all
 abortions except those determined by a physician, in his "best clinical judg-
 ment," to be "necessary" was void for vagueness.46 The Court concluded
 that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, because it did no more
 than direct doctors to act responsibly, while allowing them freedom to exer-
 cise the professional judgment of necessity "in the light of all factors-physi-
 cal, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
 well-being of the patient." 47 This list of factors has been offered as the
 "Bolton definition" of "medically necessary." 48
 It has been argued that Beal v. Doe implicity adopted this Bolton defini-
 tion,49 apparently because the Beal Court took note of the parties' assertion
 that the Pennsylvania regulation was broad enough to encompass the Bolton
 41. 432 U.S. at 444.
 42. Id. at 446 (the Court would not "presume that Congress intended to condition a
 State's participation in the Medicaid program on its willingness to undercut [an] important
 interest ....").
 43. Id.
 44. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396 (1976).
 45. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Bolton was a companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
 113 (1973), in which the Court held that the constitutionally protected right of privacy
 includes a qualified right to terminate pregnancy, and that a state may not directly interfere
 with the decision of a woman and her physician to exercise this right. In Bolton, the Court
 struck down certain procedural requirements of the Georgia abortion statute as unduly
 burdening the constitutional right defined in Roe v. Wade, and then held that the remainder
 of the statute-which prohibited abortions that were not, in the attending physician's
 judgment, "necessary"-was not void for vagueness.
 46. 410 U.S. at 191.
 47. Id. at 192.
 48. See, e.g., Smith v. Ginsberg, No. 75-0380 CH (S.D.W. Va. May 9, 1978).
 49. See D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609, 621 (D. Utah 1978); Plaintiffs' Brief in
 Support of Interim Relief at 6-7, Right to Choose v. Byrne, No. C-3817-77 (N.J. Super. Ct.
 Ch. Div. Jan. 107 1979),
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 factors.50 Of course, the issue of funding restrictions on medically necessary
 services was not before the Court in Beal.5' More important, the Bolton
 standard cannot be reconciled with the holding in Beal: the Bolton definition
 encompasses elective, or non-therapeutic, abortions performed for familial,
 social, or emotional reasons, while the Beal decision held that states may
 limit funding for such abortions.
 Moreover, the Bolton definition is inappropriate in the funding context
 of Medicaid. The Court presented that definition on the same day it estab-
 lished that, as a constitutional matter, a state may not directly interfere with
 a physician's judgment that an abortion should be performed.52 The Court
 has since held, however, that a state has no constitutional obligation to pay
 for medical care, including abortions:53 a denial of Medicaid funding is thus
 not considered a direct interference with a physician's judgment.54 There-
 fore, in determining how best to allocate its Medicaid funds, a state has
 more freedom to implement policy choices and value judgments favoring
 some medical procedures over others, and may choose to limit payment to
 fewer situations than those encompassed within the Bolton factors. Title
 XIX's intense concern for cost control and proper utilization of services Il
 supports the conclusion that the Bolton standard, which encompasses elec-
 tive or unnecessary procedures, cannot represent a minimum requirement in
 the funding context.
 Justice Brennan's dissent in Beal suggests another definition of "medi-
 cally necessary." 15 He contended that when a patient suffers from a condi-
 tion requiring some sort of medical treatment-such as pregnancy, for
 example-any treatment chosen by a physician is "medically necessary." 67
 This definition closely parallels that of the medical community, which con-
 siders any safe and efficacious treatment responsive to a medical problem to
 be "necessary." 58 However, Justice Brennan's "condition" argument was
 implicitly rejected in Beal, since the Court in that case examined the necessity
 of the particular treatment at issue, rather than the need for any treatment
 at all. Furthermore, neither Justice Brennan's definition nor that of the
 medical community can be reconciled with the holding in Beal that a state
 is not required to fund elective procedures since, under either view, many
 such procedures could be considered "necessary." More important, such
 broad definitions are clearly incompatible with a state's statutory authority
 50. After setting forth the Bolton standards, the Court stated: "We were informed
 during oral argument that the Pennsylvania definition of medical necessity is broad enough
 to encompass the factors specified in Bolton." 432 U.S. at 442 n.3.
 51. The regulation at issue in Beal only restricted funding for non-necessary abortions.
 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
 52. See note 45 supra.
 53. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (laws restricting Medicaid benefits for
 elective abortions do not violate the equal protection clause).
 54. Id. at 473-75.
 55. See notes 24-35 and accompanying text supra.
 56. 432 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
 57. Id. at 450.
 58. For a thorough discussion of the attempts to define "medically necessary," see
 Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 931, 954-58 (1977).
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 to establish standards for the scope and duration of covered services,59 and
 are inconsistent with Congress's desire to control Medicaid's escalating
 costs.A0 Thus, these definitions of "medically necessary" must also be
 rejected.
 One court has adopted an extremely narrow definition of "medically
 necessary," uniquely tailored to abortions. In D.R. v. Mitchell,61 the District
 Court for Utah apparently assumed that all "medically necessary" abortions
 must be funded under Medicaid. In defining this class of abortions, how-
 ever, the court gave great weight to the fact that, at the time title XIX was
 enacted, abortions were generally illegal unless necessary to preserve a
 woman's life. Consequently, the court defined "medically necessary" abor-
 tions to include only such life-saving procedures.62 This reasoning ignores
 the fact that title XIX is framed in terms of general categories of care rather
 than specific procedures.63 Thus, the Mitchell standard, or any other defini-
 tion tailored to a specific procedure, cannot be a valid tool for analyzing
 state restrictions on Medicaid funding.
 2. A Proposed Definition. To be suitable in the funding context, the
 definition of "medically necessary" must not be so broad that it clearly con-
 tradicts statutory concerns. At the same time, it must not be drawn so nar-
 rowly that it only applies to one particular procedure. In light of these
 considerations, the most appropriate definition of "medically necessary" care
 is: any item or procedure indicated to prevent or cure a condition that poses
 serious danger to the physical or mental health of an individual.64 This
 definition excludes purely elective procedures, and it provides guidance to
 both states and physicians to determine whether services and facilities are
 utilized only so far as necessary. Since it establishes a range of non-
 necessary, or elective, services that a state may restrict, the definition is com-
 patible with the congressional desire to reduce the costs of the Medicaid
 program.
 B. Does Title XIX Require States to Fund All Medically
 Necessary Services?
 Although the definition of "medically necessary" presented above is not
 so obviously inconsistent with title XIX as are the other formulations that
 59. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
 60. See notes 24-35 and accompanying text supra.
 61. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
 62. Id. at 623. But see Zbaraz v. Quem, [1978 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID
 GUIDE (CCH) ? 29,001, at 9730 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1978): necessaryay medical services are
 more than services to save a life in peril."
 63. See notes 149-51 and accompanying text infra.
 64. This definition should be construed to include follow-up and pretreatment care, as
 well as treatment necessary to prevent serious deformity or malfunction.
 Of course, the final judgment of medical necessity must be left to the medical pro-
 fession. Any definition that might be formulated is therefore susceptible to the problems
 of abuse and varying individual interpretations that work to broaden coverage. There is no
 alternative to reliance on professional judgment, however, because the endless variety of
 individual situations that may make a procedure medically necessary could never even be
 catalogued, much less codified.
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 have been advanced, the question remains whether states must fund all
 services falling within this definition. Some courts relied on Beal v. Doe in
 holding that states must fund all medically necessary care.65 Beal, however,
 did no more than approve a restriction on benefits for elective abortions-
 it cannot be read as thereby disapproving limitations on funding for neces-
 sary abortions. Rather than settling the latter question, the Court carefully
 left it open, indicating that "serious statutory questions might be presented
 if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its cover-
 age... ." 66 The answer to these "serious questions" lies in careful examina-
 tion of the statute.
 The principal statutory basis for the contention that states cannot elim-
 inate coverage for medically necessary services is the general purpose clause,
 section 1396, and its undefined reference to "necessary medical services."
 This phrase is explicitly used to describe the beneficiaries of the program:
 "individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
 of necessary medical services." 67 The phrase can also be read to implicity
 modify "medical assistance" 68-the assistance provided under a program
 designed to aid those who cannot afford "necessary medical services" should
 at least cover such services.69 Even if it is inferred that "necessary" does
 modify "medical assistance," however, any obligation to provide "necessary
 medical assistance" is expressly limited by yet another clause of section 1396
 -assistance need only be furnished "as far as practicable under the con-
 ditions in [each] state." Thus, while section 1396 establishes that one of
 Medicaid's objectives is to provide necessary medical services, it also reflects
 a congressional intent that each state have the freedom to tailor programs
 that are responsive to the fiscal conditions prevalent in that state. Other
 objectives of the Medicaid program are to encourage states to provide high
 quality medical care to indigents at the lowest possible cost, and to dis-
 courage costly and wasteful misutilization of services.70 If a state is required
 65. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383, 389 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub
 nom. Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978): "we believe that Beal v. Doe...
 also identifies the services within the five broad categories which are required to be covered
 by a State Medicaid Plan and those are the services which are deemed 'medically necessary."'
 See also Smith v. Ginsberg, No. 75-0380 CH (S.D.W. Va. May 9, 1978).
 66. 432 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
 67. The First Circuit relied on the context of the phrase-in the authorization section,
 describing the intended beneficiaries of the program-in concluding that "necessary medical
 services" does not impose a substantive funding requirement. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No.
 78-1324, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
 68. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
 69. Judge Mulligan, dissenting in Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1975),
 argued that "necessary" implicity modified "medical assistance," so that states were prohibited
 from funding unnecessary, or elective, services. This view is inconsistent with Congress's
 original intention that Medicaid recipients should receive comprehensive coverage of all
 services ordered by a physician. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
 Beal v. Doe squarely rejects Judge Mulligan's view, holding that "the federal statute
 leaves a State free to provide such coverage [for elective procedures] if it so desires." 432
 U.S. at 447.
 70. These additional objectives can be gleaned from the 1965 S. REP., supra note 2, and
 the reports accompanying amendments to title XIX. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 222, supra note 8
 H. R. REP. No. 231, supra note 8.
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 to fund all medically necessary services, other viable objectives-especially
 those of cost control and state discretion to meet fiscal concerns-will be
 undercut. Therefore, it is unlikely that Congress intended that a require-
 ment be inferred from section 1396, since such a construction would be detri-
 mental to other statutory concerns.
 Moreover, in the context of Social Security Act grant programs, broadly
 stated goals are rarely equivalent to requirements imposed on the states.7'
 The Supreme Court recently reemphasized this principle in Quern v. Mand-
 ley,72 a case which raised issues of state discretion versus federal mandate
 in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, title IV-A of the
 Social Security Act.73 The Court noted that the potential breadth of Social
 Security programs, as stated in general purpose clauses, militates against
 drawing the inference that Congress intended to require states to extend aid
 as far as suggested by these clauses.74 To support this conclusion the Court
 examined the general purpose clause of title XX,75 which like the Medicaid
 statute's general purpose clause, directs states to provide assistance only "as
 far as practicable under the conditions in that state." The Court concluded
 that such language vests ultimate decisionmaking authority in the states.76
 Absent express language to the contrary, therefore, general purpose clauses
 merely define the parameters of a program for which federal funding will be
 available, rather than imposing mandatory funding requirements on the states.
 Under the analysis of Quern v. Mandley, section 1396 alone is hardly
 sufficient to support a conclusion that states must fund all medically neces-
 sary services. Other provisions of the Medicaid statute must therefore be
 examined to determine whether there is any express support for such a re-
 quirement in title XIX.
 One statutory section offered as evidence that states are expressly re-
 71. Such grant programs customarily leave administration and program details to the
 states. Those requirements that are imposed are set forth in a separate statutory section
 detailing the necessary components of a state program plan, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A.?
 1396a(a)(l)-(40) (West 1974 & Supp. 1978), rather than in the clauses authorizing appro-
 priations for general purposes. Requirements are usually included to ensure that federal
 funds will be spent in an efficient, honest manner, consistent with congressional aims. Cf.
 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947) (federal govern-
 ment has power to fix terms on which funds allotted to states may be disbursed, to assure
 that funds are spent in accordance with federal policy).
 72. 436 U.S. 725, 745 (1978).
 73. Illinois's Emergency Assistance (EA) program for needy families was challenged
 because it limited eligibility for assistance more narrowly than did the federal standard in 42
 U.S.C. ? 606(e) (1976). The Court concluded that ? 606 defines the permissible scope
 of an EA program for purposes of federal funding, but does not impose mandatory eligibility
 standards on participating states, because states have broad discretion to shape their programs
 under the Social Security Act, as evidenced by language in general purpose clauses. 436
 U.S. at 745.
 74. The Court pointed out that a literal application of such broad goals "would create
 an entirely open-ended program, not susceptible of meaningful fiscal or programmatic
 control by the States." Id. at 746.
 75. 42 U.S.C. ? 1397 (1976), which provides for appropriations to encourage[] each
 State, as jar as practicable under the conditions in that State, to furnish services directed at
 the goal of . . . achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or
 eliminate dependency . . ." (emphasis added).
 76. 436 U.S. at 745 (quoting 42 U.S.C. ? 1397 (1976)).
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 quired to fund all medically necessary services is section 1396a(a) (19),
 which directs state plans to "provide . . . safeguards . . . to assure that . . .
 care and services will be provided in a manner consistent with simplicity
 of administration and the best interests of the recipients." 77 It has been
 argued that limitations excluding necessary services are never in the best
 interests of recipients, and thus violate the statute.78 The Senate report ac-
 companying the Medicaid bill, however, reveals that the principal purpose
 of this provision is to facilitate indigents' access to medical care by minimiz-
 ing complicated administrative procedures that would delay eligibility de-
 cisions and discourage health-care providers from participating in the pro-
 gram."" The legislative history lacks an indication that the "best interests"
 clause is aimed at the services that a state must cover. Thus, section 1396a
 (a) (19) is hardly evidence of a specific intent to require states to fund all
 medically necessary services.
 The HEW regulation approving coverage limits based on the criterion
 of medical necessity80 provides a second possible indication that the Medi-
 caid scheme prohibits states from restricting funding for medically necessary
 services. It has been argued that this regulation should be read as allowing
 limits only on nonnecessary services. On its face, however, the regulation
 does no more than suggest that a restriction on funding unnecessary services
 is one of a number of limits that would satisfy the statutory standard of
 reasonableness. The regulation is addressed solely to the question of what
 states do not have to fund-it cannot be read to impose an affirmative obli-
 gation to fund all services except those within the suggested limitation.81
 In addition to suggesting limits on unnecessary services, this regulation
 expressly permits states to limit the duration of covered services.82 As ap-
 plied to some services-such as the number of inpatient days or physician
 visits that will be funded-this regulation would authorize exclusion of Medi-
 caid benefits for some medically necessary services, since there will always
 be individuals needing these services beyond the number of days covered
 under a state plan.83 Therefore, far from indicating that states may not re-
 strict funding for medically necessary services, this regulation actually per-
 mits states to limit funding of some medically necessary care.
 The preceding analysis demonstrates that under title XIX, the goal of
 providing all necessary care cannot be read as an irreducible minimum re-
 77. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (19) (1976).
 78. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
 79. 1965 S. REP., supra note 2, at 76, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
 at 2017: "This provision was included in order to provide some assurance that the States wil
 not use unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility . . . or . . . administer the
 provisions for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the
 care to be provided."
 80. 42C.F.R ?449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977).
 81. Congress's desire to discourage costly misutilization of services, see notes 25-26
 and accompanying text supra, supports the conclusion that this regulation speaks only
 to the question of permissible coverage limitations rather than coverage requirements.
 82. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
 83. See, e.g., Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. Va.
 1977).
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 quirement on the states. Several important amendments to title XIX support
 this conclusion. The comprehensive coverage clause, section 1903 (e) ,84
 would have at least required that states fund all necessary medical services,
 and probably would have compelled coverage of a full range of elective or
 non-necessary care as well.85 Fiscal pressures forced Congress to abandon
 the comprehensive coverage requirement in 1972,86 precisely because it was
 no longer feasible to require states to provide such coverage.87 When sec-
 tion 1903(e) was repealed, the only textual support for the conclusion that
 the funding of all necessary medical services is a requirement rather than a
 goal also disappeared.
 The 1972 amendment that repealed section 1902(d)88 also indicates
 that states are not required to fund all medically necessary services. This
 amendment gave states much greater freedom to eliminate optional service
 categories from their plans and reduce the scope of coverage within manda-
 tory categories.89 Some optional services may, in many instances, be med-
 ically necessary. Prescription drugs are an obvious example.90 Since states
 are expressly permitted to eliminate such items from their plans, it cannot
 be concluded that they must fund all medically necessary services.
 The evolution of the Medicaid statute reveals a conflict between Con-
 gress's initial intent to mandate comprehensive coverage and Congress's
 second thoughts about the program. But it is these second thoughts, moti-
 vated by fiscal concerns, that shape the Medicaid program as it exists today.
 The trend has been toward limiting both the scope and the cost of Medicaid.
 A "medical necessity" coverage requirement would be contrary to both
 trends. Since there is neither any express indication that it be a require-
 ment, nor even a definition of the term in the statute, the phrase "necessary
 medical services" cannot be viewed as a coverage mandate upon the states.
 While it does not represent a minimum funding requirement on the
 states, the concept of medical necessity is still highly relevant in evaluating
 state restrictions on Medicaid coverage. The statutory scheme requires that
 state coverage standards be reasonable. As later discussion will demon-
 strate, the reasonableness of any given restriction will often turn on the ex-
 tent to which the medical needs of the Medicaid population still are met.
 III. SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS-WHAT IS REASONABLE?
 Although title XIX does not require participating states to fund all
 medically necessary services, state restrictions on the funding of such services
 84. Social Security Amendments of 1965 Pub. L. No. 89-97, ? 1903(e), 79 Stat. 286
 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. ? 1396b(e) (1970)). For text of this clause, see note 27 supra.
 85. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
 86. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
 87. S. REP. No. 91-222, supra note 8, at 5-6, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
 NEws at 1081.
 88. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
 89. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
 90. See Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977); notes 131-40 and accom-
 panying text infra.
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 must still be "reasonable" 91 in the context of the Medicaid scheme. Since
 Medicaid is a program of "cooperative federalism," 92 the reasonableness of
 a given restriction depends in large part upon the state interest that under-
 lies it.93
 The most commonly advanced state interest justifying coverage restric-
 tions is the need for fiscal control of the state program.94 Since title XIX-
 particularly as amended95-recognizes the importance of the state's fiscal in-
 terests, coverage limitations that greatly reduce costs should carry a strong
 presumption of reasonableness.96 Of course, every restriction of a state
 plan's coverage results in some immediate cost savings. When a restriction
 yields little97 or no98 cost savings over the long run, however, the state's
 fiscal interest in imposing such a limitation deserves little weight.
 When a state coverage restriction is challenged, the Medicaid scheme
 requires that the state's fiscal concerns be balanced against the statutory in-
 terest in providing for the health care needs of the indigent.99 This Note will
 next examine various restrictions that states have imposed on the coverage
 of their Medicaid plans, and apply this balancing test to determine their
 validity.
 91. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
 92. See notes 2-7 and accompanying text supra.
 93. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (Congress did not intend that a state be
 required to undercut its "unquestionably strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal
 childbirth" as a condition of participating in Medicaid).
 94. The state interest in fiscal control has two distinct elements: first, the interest in
 reducing costs and limiting the growth of the welfare budget; and second, the interest in
 retaining control over the allocation of welfare funds among competing uses. The Medicaid
 scheme, however, accords less weight to the latter interest. See note 96 infra.
 95. Most notably, ? 1903(e), the comprehensive coverage requirement, was repealed to
 alleviate the fiscal burden on the states. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra. Other
 amendments to title XIX were also motivated by the problem of excessive costs. See notes
 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
 96. Title XIX gives greater weight to the state's interest in saving money than to the
 state's interest in retaining control over the allocation of its welfare resources. The former
 interest is reflected in several ways: medical assistance must be provided only to the extent
 financially practicable for a state, 42 U.S.C. ? 1396 (1976); provision is made for rate-
 setting and utilization review requirements designed to control costs, id. ? 1396a(a)(30)-(33)
 (1976) as amended by Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No.
 95-42, ? 2(a) (3), 91 Stat. 1176 (1977); and the statute has been amended several times in
 order to reduce the demand on state finances, see notes 27-35 and accompanying text supra.
 On the other hand, by participating in the program-and thus accepting the federal
 requirements that it imposes-states necessarily relinquish some authority over the allocation
 of welfare resources.
 97. For example, the cutbacks in coverage of prescription drugs struck down in Dodson
 v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977), eliminated the provision of many inexpensive
 drugs, which compelled doctors to issue multiple prescriptions for the individual elements of
 the compounds, at a substantially higher cost. See notes 131-40 and accompanying text
 infra.
 98. Abortion funding restrictions do not produce net cost-savings because the alternative,
 childbirth, is more expensive. See notes 156-57 and accompanying text infra.
 99. The interest in protecting health underlies the entire Medicaid program, see notes 2-3
 and accompanying text supra, and is reflected in the statutory sections discussed in notes
 13-35 and accompanying text supra.
 Although the amendments to title XIX were motivated by fiscal concerns, Congress
 viewed these modifications as consistent with, rather than in derogation of, the health
 interest; by allowing states to trim their Medicaid programs, Congress clearly intended
 that "[state fiscal crises should not operate to prevent the poor from receiving basic medical
 care and services ...." H.R. REP. No. 231, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
 CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5086.
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 A. Durational Limits and the Statistical Impact Test
 States are expressly authorized to place durational limits on covered
 services,100 and this restrictive technique has proved popular.'0' Virginia,
 for example, limits reimbursement for hospital stays to the first twenty-one
 days of hospitalization. This provision was upheld by a lower federal court
 in Virginia Hospital Association v. Kenley,102 even though as a matter of
 medical necessity some Medicaid recipients would require more than twenty-
 one days of hospitalization.103 The court examined the Virginia limitation
 in light of the HEW regulation that requires items of medical care covered
 by a state plan to be "sufficient in amount, duration and scope to reasonably
 achieve their purpose." 104 Construing this regulation to mean that service
 coverage need not meet every individual's needs, but must only be sufficient
 to meet the needs of the Medicaid population as a whole,'05 the court
 adopted a statistical impact test to determine the sufficiency of Virginia's
 hospitalization coverage. The hospital stays of ninety-two percent of Medi-
 caid recipients needing hospitalization fell within the twenty-one day limita-
 tion, and thus were funded in their entirety.'06 The court therefore concluded
 that Virginia's coverage of hospital care was entirely reasonable, and the
 twenty-one day limitation valid.'07
 The premise underlying the Virginia Hospital Association decision-
 that a coverage limitation is reasonable if the needs of most Medicaid re-
 cipients are met-necessarily follows from the statutory provision allowing
 states to formulate standards governing the extent of medical assistance that
 will be covered.'08 If the purpose of an item of medical care had to be
 "reasonably achieved" for each patient, then no general limits could be im-
 posed on the scope, duration, or amount of covered services, and a state's
 authority to establish coverage standards would be meaningless. Such a
 result is clearly untenable, particularly in light of the statute's legislative his-
 tory.'09 And since sufficiency of service coverage must be analyzed for the
 100. 42 C.F.R. ? 449.10(a) (5) (i) (1977).
 101. Eighteen states have placed durational limits on inpatient services, physicians'
 services, nursing home services, and other types of care. See [1977] 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
 GUIDE (CCH) ?d 15,500-15,660.
 102. 427 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Va. 1977).
 103. The court rejected the contention that title XIX requires funding of all medically
 necessary services as incompatible with the express authority to impose durational limits. Id.
 at 785.
 104. 42 C.F.R. ? 449.10(a) (5) () (1977).
 105. 427 F. Supp. at 785-86.
 The court's interpretation is in accord with that of HEW, see id., and is consistent
 with title XIX, see notes 108-09 and accompanying text infra.
 106. 427 F. Supp. at 786.
 107. The court also argued that the limit was justified because it was rationally related
 to the state's legitimate interest in controlling the costs of its Medicaid program. Id. at
 784. Of course, any durational limitation will result in cost-savings; to be valid, however,
 such a limitation must also meet the requirement of reasonableness that is reflected in the
 statistical impact test.
 108. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (17) (1976).
 109. Congress clearly indicated that the phrase "extent of medical assistance under the
 plan," 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a)(17) (1976) (emphasis added), means that states may determine
 "the number of days of care provided under the plan." 1965 S. REP., supra note 2, at 81.
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 Medicaid population as a whole, the statistical impact test employed in
 Virginia Hospital Association is a sound approach for analyzing the validity
 of other types of durational limitations.
 The New Jersey plan contains a durational limitation on hospitalization
 coverage110 that differs substantially from Virginia's absolute twenty-one day
 limitation. Rather than restrict coverage to an arbitrary number of days,
 New Jersey extends Medicaid benefits for each patient only for the period
 during which that patient requires acute-level hospital care. Coverage
 terminates when a patient may be satisfactorily treated in a skilled nursing
 facility. The state suffers from a shortage of nursing home beds available
 for Medicaid recipients, however, and many patients must therefore remain
 hospitalized while awaiting more appropriate placement."' Although these
 patients no longer need hospital care, they still need some level of inpatient
 care: 12 the prolonged hospital stays are medically necessary, but are not
 fully covered by New Jersey's Medicaid plan.
 This limitation was challenged in Monmouth Medical Center v. New
 Jersey."13 The court assumed that title XIX required reimbursement of all
 medically necessary inpatient services,"14 and thus held that New Jersey's
 limitation was invalid because it excluded benefits for patients who still
 needed some level of inpatient care. Under the court's analysis, the con-
 See also id. at 79; 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (13) (D) (1976) (a state must provide "for payment
 of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services provided under the plan") (emphasis
 added).
 The fact that a state may choose to cover only part of the cost of any service, 42
 U.S.C. ? 1396d(a) (1976), also supports the conclusion that title XIX does not require that
 the full purpose of an item of medical care be achieved for every individual.
 110. Sections 202 and 202.9 of the New Jersey Hospital Service Manual, derived from
 N.J. Admin. Code 10:52-1.2(a)-(b) (1), provide that:
 202. Benefits are not payable for any services rendered or items dispensed or
 furnished in connection with:
 202.9 Inpatient hospital services rendered after the day it is medically necessary,
 except when special circumstances prevent the discharge or transfer of the patient....
 Payment for special circumstances (social necessity) is specifically precluded for:
 (a) Patients awaiting placement in a skilled Nursing Facility or Intermediate
 Care Facility.
 These sections are reproduced in Monmouth Medical Center v. New Jersey, 158 N.J. Super.
 241, 248 (App. Div.), certification granted, 77 N. J. 506 (1978).
 111. See, e.g., Brief and Appendix for Respondents at 2, 10, Monmouth Medical Center
 v. New Jersey, 158 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div.), certification granted, 77 N. J. 506 (1978).
 112. The New Jersey limitation is tied to individual need, but not to the full extent
 of medical necessity. It may thus be contrasted with the New York rule that ostensibly
 limits funding for pre-operative inpatient care to one day, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
 ? 365-a(5) (d) (McKinney Supp. 1978), but that has been interpreted to allow coverage
 for as many days as are required for a particular patient. 10 N.Y. CODE RULES & REGS.
 ? 85.4(a). The New York limitation as applied-upheld in Medical Soc'y v. Toia, [1977-1978
 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ? 28,364 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
 grounds, 560 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1977)-thus turns on individual need, to the full extent of
 medical necessity.
 113. 158 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div.), certification granted, 77 N.J. 506 (1978).
 114. The court based this assumption on its conclusion that "the primary object of
 [the Medicaid] program is adequate patient care which is found to be medically necessary."
 Id. at 252.
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 trolling factor for determining medical necessity was not where care is per-
 formed, but whether any inpatient care is required.
 Because the court assumed that title XIX requires states to fund all
 medically necessary services, it discounted the strong state interests that made
 the New Jersey limitation both reasonable and consistent with the objectives
 of title XIX. New Jersey's refusal to fund hospital stays after the point at
 which a patient can be treated more properly in a skilled nursing facility is
 intended to discourage overutilization of inpatient services by encouraging
 hospitals to locate nursing home beds as soon as possible."l5 This purpose
 is entirely consistent with the objectives and requirements of title XIX since
 the statute explicitly requires states to provide safeguards against over-
 utilization."6
 New Jersey also has strong fiscal interests in imposing such a limitation.
 The state has estimated that absent the limitation, an additional annual ex-
 penditure of $37.7 million would be required to fund prolonged hospital
 stays."7 Permitting the limitation also serves New Jersey's interest in con-
 trolling the allocation of state welfare resources."8 Forcing the state to bear
 the additional expense of prolonged hospital stays could lead to cuts in other
 areas-such as reductions in coverage of optional services-that would be
 detrimental to the state's entire Medicaid population. But the state has
 made a permissible policy choice to use its welfare budget to cover optional
 categories rather than the entire duration of all hospital stays. These state
 fiscal concerns provide strong support for the argument that New Jersey's
 limitation is reasonable.
 B. Cutbacks on the Scope of Services Within Mandatory and Optional
 Service Categories
 In addition to limiting the duration of covered services, states have re-
 sponded to fiscal concerns by reducing the scope of services offered within
 specific statutory coverage categories. For example, New York limits bene-
 fits for surgery to emergency situations, to those procedures necessary to
 alleviate severe pain or threats of disability and death, and to operations
 that cannot be deferred without substantially increasing the medical risk in-
 115. Id. at 251.
 116. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a) (30) (1976) requires state plans to "provide such methods
 and procedures relating to the utilization of . . . care and services available under the
 plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care
 and services ...." See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
 117. Affidavit of Ann Klein, Respondent's Petition for Certification to the New Jersey
 Supreme Court at 20a, Monmouth Medical Center v. New Jersey, 77 N.J. 506 (1978).
 118. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.
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 volved."19 In Medical Society v. Toia,120 the United States Court of Appeals
 for the Second Circuit upheld this limitation as consistent with the state's
 statutory obligation to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of medical
 services.121 The court also relied on the HEW regulation which expressly
 provides that appropriate "limits may be placed on services based on such
 criteria as medical necessity" 122 without discussing the definition of "medical
 necessity."
 In limiting medical assistance for surgery to the specified situations,
 New York was responding to the HEW regulation authorizing limitations
 on unnecessary procedures. Although the district court concluded that New
 York's definition of "medically necessary" was too narrow,'23 such a narrow
 definition is appropriate in the funding context. New York's statute does
 provide benefits when a serious health threat exists, and the limitation is
 therefore compatible with the title XIX health interest.'24 Moreover, the
 statute was enacted in response to an identified problem of overutilization
 of surgical services by Medicaid recipients,'25 and is thus consistent with title
 XIX's requirement that states discourage misutilization of services.'26
 Finally, the limitation is consistent with title XIX's cost-control objec-
 tive, in light of the state fiscal interests involved. New York was concerned
 by the high rate of unnecessary surgery that contributed to the burdensome
 cost of its Medicaid program;'27 by eliminating such surgery, the state could
 119. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW ? 365-a(5) (McKinney Supp. 1978) provides in part:
 (a) Medical assistance shall include surgical benefits for emergency or urgent
 surgery for the alleviation of severe pain, for immediate diagnosis or treatment
 of conditions which threaten disability or death if not promptly diagnosed or treated.
 (b) Medical assistance shall include surgical benefits for surgical procedures which
 meet standards for surgical intervention, as established by the state commissioner
 of health on the basis of medically indicated risk factors, and medically necessary
 surgery where delay in surgical intervention would substantially increase the medical
 risk.
 (c) Medical assistance shall include surgical benefits for other deferrable surgical
 procedures specified by the state commissioner of health, based on the likelihood
 that deferral of such procedures for six months or more may jeopardize life or
 essential function, or cause severe pain ....
 120. 560 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDIC-
 AID GUIDE (CCH) ? 28,364 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The district court had adopted a broad definition
 of medically necessary care, regarding it as any usual therapeutic treatment for a condition.
 The New York restriction was thus considered faulty because many procedures that were
 medically indicated under the court's definition would not be funded. The district court held,
 in the alternative, that every procedure falling within the mandatory coverage category of
 physician's services had to be funded by the state. This opinion, issued before the Supreme
 Court decided Beal v. Doe, is clearly no longer valid in light of Beal's holding that states do
 not have to fund every procedure within the mandatory service categories.
 121. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
 122. 42 C.F.R. ? 449.10(a) (5) (i) (1977).
 123. The district court broadly defined "medically necessary" as any therapeutic treat-
 ment ordered by a physician to respond to a condition causing inconvenience or discomfort.
 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 28,364, at 9285. This
 standard of broad deference to the physician's judgment is inappropriate in the funding context.
 See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
 124. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
 125. 560 F.2d at 537.
 126. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
 127. See 560 F.2d at 537.
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 save up to sixty-five million dollars annually.'28 The magnitude of this fiscal
 interest creates a presumption that the restriction is reasonable.'29 More-
 over, when this strong state fiscal interest is considered in light of the restric-
 tion's accommodation of the statutory health interest, New York's limitation
 on surgical benefits satisfies the reasonableness test.
 New York's limitation affected the scope of services within a mandatory
 coverage category. More typically, however, states attempt to limit the scope
 of optional service categories. The analysis to be applied is nonetheless
 the same: once a state chooses to extend Medicaid benefits to optional
 service categories, any restrictions on care falling within these service cate-
 gories must satisfy the reasonableness test.'30
 Georgia's Medicaid plan included benefits for the optional service cate-
 gory of prescription drugs. After problems with abuse of the drug program
 arose, the state proposed a drastic curtailment of the list of drugs approved
 for Medicaid reimbursement. In Dodson v. Parham,'3' a federal district
 court enjoined implementation of the new drug formulary because it ex-
 cluded many drugs necessary to treat certain individual conditions. The
 court relied on the HEW regulation requiring all services provided by a
 state, optional or mandatory, to be "sufficient in amount, duration and scope
 to reasonably achieve their purpose." 132 The decision implicitly assumed
 that title XIX requires coverage of all medically necessary care. Finding
 that the purpose of prescription drugs is to cure, mitigate, or prevent disease,'38
 the court held that any limitation excluding drugs necessary for this purpose
 is not reasonable.
 Despite the court's erroneous assumption that title XIX requires states
 to fund all medically necessary care, its conclusion that Georgia's restriction
 was unreasonable nonetheless seems valid since the cost savings expected to
 arise from the limitation were not large enough to outweigh the restriction's
 incompatibility with health concerns.
 The proposed formulary of reimbursable drugs largely ignored the title
 XIX health interest because the new list omitted many drugs that were the
 only known efficacious treatment for some illnesses and within some special-
 ized practice areas. Moreover, the list included several drugs no longer
 prescribed because they were outmoded or produced hazardous side effects,
 while excluding safer or more effective alternatives.'34 Because the list ex-
 cluded the only available drugs for some illnesses, it was effectively an abso-
 128. Id.
 129. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
 130. The statutory requirement that all standards must be reasonable extends to all
 categories of medical assistance offered under a state plan. 42 U.S.C. ? 1396a(a)(17)
 (1976) (the key phrase is "medical assistance under the plan").
 131. 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
 132. 42 C.F.R. ?449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977).
 133. The court relied on the HEW regulation defining prescription drugs, 42 C.F.R.
 ?449.10(b)(12)(i) (1977). 427 F. Supp. at 104.
 134. For the medical evidence as to the shortcomings of the new drug list, see 427
 F. Supp. at 105-07.
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 lute denial 135 of prescription drug services in those instances. Thus, in
 operation the list was very close to a prohibited discrimination based solely
 on the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.'36
 Georgia claimed that the limitation would produce an annual savings
 of six million dollars.'37 There was medical evidence, however, that the
 restriction actually would result in little or no savings, because most com-
 pound drugs were not on the list. Since many of the less expensive
 compounds were excluded, patients would often have to purchase all the
 component drugs separately, at a greater cost to both the state and the
 individual.'38
 After balancing the health and fiscal interests, Georgia's restriction
 would appear to be unreasonable because the state's fiscal interest is not
 strong enough to outweigh the detriment to health.'39 The restriction also
 would not appear to satisfy a statistical impact test of reasonableness, be-
 cause there was evidence that the new list would fail to meet the needs of
 up to ninety percent of the Medicaid population.'40
 C. Absolute Restrictions on Funding Certain Procedures
 Some states have attempted to cut back the scope of their Medicaid
 programs by completely prohibiting benefits for certain operations. Three
 states-Georgia, Minnesota, and California-prohibited funding for trans-
 sexual surgery. All three of these absolute restrictions have been struck
 down,'4' primarily on the ground that, when medically necessary, this surgery
 must be funded.
 135. See notes 141-46 and accompanying text infra.
 136. This type of arbitrary discrimination is prohibited by the same HEW regulation
 that requires medical care items to be sufficient to "reasonably achieve their purpose." 42
 C.F.R. ?449.10(a)(5)(i) (1977).
 137. 427 F. Supp. at 101.
 138. Id. at 106-07.
 The state's cost-saving justification was further reduced by its prior approval system, see
 id. at 102-04, which would probably have cost the state more to administer than an open
 formulary would have cost, id. at 107.
 139. The court suggested that the limited drug formulary would be reasonable if it
 were combined with an effective prior approval system that made non-list drugs available to
 an individual when certified by the patient's physician to be medically necessary. Id.
 at 108. Cf. note 119 and accompanying text supra (New York's flexible guidelines tied
 to an individual's need for pre-operative care). Georgia had a prior approval system, but
 it was faulty because it operated only during weekday business hours and thus failed to
 cover emergencies, 427 F. Supp. at 108, because it left the final say to pharmacists, id.,
 and because it was administratively cumbersome and costly, id. at 107.
 140. 427 F. Supp. at 106. The evidence presented consisted of physicians' testimony on
 the effect on their practice.
 141. In Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom.
 Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978), the court held that Georgia's restriction
 violated title XIX to the extent that it irrebuttably denied coverage for medically necessary
 services. The court indicated that if the limitation had reserved for administrators discretion
 to consider individual medical necessity, it would have been reasonable.
 Minnesota's absolute ban on transsexual surgery was struck down in Doe v. Minnesota
 Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota Supreme Court
 held that since sex conversion surgery is the only known effective treatment for transsexualism,
 excluding benefits for it violated the HEW regulation prohibiting states from arbitrarily
 denying coverage solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition. 42 C.F.R.
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 Although title XIX does not require states to fund all medically neces-
 sary services, absolute restrictions on selected medical procedures almost
 certainly must fall for failure to satisfy the reasonableness standard. When
 a state absolutely prohibits benefits for a particular type of care, it ignores
 the statutory interest in protecting the health of indigents.142 No one in
 medical need of the restricted procedure will be covered, and the purpose
 of the restricted service will not be "reasonably achieved" for any part of the
 Medicaid population. Thus, absolute restrictions on selected procedures
 within a service category will almost always be invalid.
 In the case of transsexual surgery, no state has offered interests strong
 enough to justify an absolute ban on the procedure. In Rush v. Parham,143
 Georgia claimed that its interest in protecting the health of its citizens justified
 restriction. Georgia argued that transsexual surgery is experimental and
 therefore potentially dangerous to health.'44 While protection of citizens'
 health is a legitimate state interest, Georgia's absolute restriction, when
 scrutinized, was actually detrimental to this interest. Since techniques for
 performing transsexual surgery have advanced beyond the point of being ex-
 perimental and hazardous,'45 there was no real danger to Georgia's citizens.
 Moreover, when an operation, even an experimental one, is truly necessary
 to preserve or protect an individual's health, the state has no legitimate
 health interest in absolutely restricting coverage for that procedure since to
 do so is to harm health rather than protect it.
 Georgia also claimed that the restriction was motivated by fiscal con-
 cerns 146 but the state failed to offer any cost-saving figures. The number of
 transsexual operations performed each year, however, is so minimal that their
 overall cost to the state could not impose a true monetary burden. Any
 fiscal savings would not be great enough to outweigh the restriction's un-
 reasonable failure to accommodate statutory health interests.
 D. Abortion Funding Restrictions
 After the Beal decision, many states passed more restrictive abortion
 funding laws. Many of these prohibited Medicaid reimbursement except
 when the life of the woman would be endangered if the pregnancy were
 ? 449.10(a) (5) (i) (1977). The decision implied that coverage for all medically necessary
 operations is mandatory, because it directed providers to evaluate each claim and to deny
 benefits only when the surgery was not medically necessary.
 California's Medicaid plan excluded benefits for cosmetic surgery, and state Health
 Department regulations included transsexual surgery within this category. In G.B. v. Lackner,
 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978), the court invalidated the restriction on the
 ground that sex conversion surgery is not merely cosmetic. The court held that whenever
 this surgery is reasonable and necessary for the treatment of illness, title XIX requires that
 it be funded. Id. at 76, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62.
 142. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
 143. 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub norn. Ruth v. Poythress, No.
 77-2743 (5th Cir. 1978).
 144. See Brief for State Appellant at 28-29, Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir.,
 filed Apr. 1978).
 145. See G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
 146. Brief for State Appellant at 26-27, Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir., filed
 Apr. 1978).
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 carried to term. Such laws are the most frequently challenged type of Medi-
 caid limitation.'47 Since they are essentially reductions in the scope of the
 inpatient and physician's services coverage categories, these abortion restric-
 tions must be subjected to the same reasonableness analysis as any other
 Medicaid cutback. Thus, the statutory health interest must be balanced
 against any state interest advanced by restrictions on Medicaid coverage for
 abortions. As later discussion will demonstrate, the annual Hyde Amend-
 ment to the Labor-HEW appropriations acts,'48 which limits federal reim-
 bursement for Medicaid abortions, alters neither the outcome of this balanc-
 ing nor the analytical approach to be taken.
 Many courts have failed to recognize that abortion funding cases require
 the same analysis as any other Medicaid funding case. Rather than sub-
 jecting abortion funding limitations to the standard reasonableness analysis,
 these courts have framed the issue as whether title XIX requires states to
 fund any abortions at all. These courts have thus emphasized the fact that
 most abortions were illegal in 1965, when the Medicaid statute was enacted.'49
 Under a proper analysis, on the other hand, the legal status of abortion in
 1965 is irrelevant because title XIX is not addressed to any specific medical
 procedure-the statute is constructed around general categories of health
 care services. The legislative history is devoid of any indication that Con-
 gress was thinking in terms of abortions-positively or negatively-when
 drafting title XIX.150 Given the constantly changing state of the art, with
 147. The conflicting judicial resolutions of these challenges are remarkable for their
 uniform reliance on Beal v. Doe. In D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978),
 the court upheld Utah's life-endangering standard on the basis of Beal. The court relied
 heavily on the state's interest in encouraging normal childbirth-an argument stressed in
 Beal-despite the fact that Utah's limitation was far more restrictive than the Pennsylvania
 regulation upheld by the Supreme Court. Doe v. Kenley, No. 78-218-A (E.D. Va. May 25,
 1978), rev'd, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1978), also relied on Beal in upholding a Virginia
 law allowing Medicaid payment for abortion only when the woman's life was threatened
 by the pregnancy.
 Three other federal district courts, however, have interpreted Beal to require states to
 fund all medically necessary abortions. In Zbaraz v. Quern, [1978 Transfer Binder]
 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ? 29,001 (N.D. Ill. 1978), and Smith v. Ginsberg,
 No. 75-03080CH (S.D. W.Va. May 9, 1978), the courts struck down statutes with life-
 endangering standards because those statutes were not broad enough to encompass the
 medical necessity factors specified in Bolton. In Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048
 (E.D. La. 1977), the court approved Louisiana's stipulation that Beal required it to fund
 all medically necessary abortions.
 These cases raise constitutional challenges to such laws in addition to statutory challenges.
 The equal protection arguments, however, are no more than a rehash of contentions already
 rejected in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and have yet to be given serious con-
 sideration by any court.
 148. Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, ? 101, 91 Stat. 1460. See notes 158-60 and
 accompanying text infra.
 149. In Beal, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that non-therapeutic abortions were
 illegal in 1965 to reinforce its conclusion that states do not have to fund such abortions.
 432 U.S. at 447.
 Other cases that have relied on the legal status of abortions in 1965 include: Roe v.
 Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 935 (2d Cir. 1975); D.R. v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609, 622 (D. Utah
 1978) (the court concluded that since non-therapeutic abortions were illegal in 1965 "it
 is utterly untenable to suggest that the Medicaid Act as originally enacted required payment
 for abortions").
 150. See 1965 S. REP., supra note 2.
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 the development of new devices, drugs, or surgical techniques and the dis-
 covery of new diseases or their causes, Congress could not have intended to
 freeze medical assistance to those procedures that were known or legal in
 1965.1'" Restrictions on abortion funding must therefore be examined under
 the same standard of reasonableness applicable in other Medicaid funding
 contexts.
 State laws that prohibit funding for abortions except when the woman's
 life is endangered are not quite the same as absolute restrictions. They
 are similar to absolute prohibitions, however, in that they do not allow for
 the exercise of administrative discretion to cover medically necessary health-
 threatening situations. In the context of the balance between state policy
 interests and health interests, these laws give little weight to the health side
 of the scale. To determine the reasonableness of such a restriction in the
 context of the Medicaid scheme, however, it is also necessary to examine the
 possible state interests that might underlie it. The state's interest in en-
 couraging normal childbirth-in essence, its interest in protecting normal
 potential life-was deemed sufficient in Beal to uphold a restriction on fund-
 ing elective abortions in non-health threatening situations.'52 But this inter-
 est cannot automatically justify limitations on funding medically necessary
 abortions, because strong health interests exist in non-elective situations that
 do not enter into the balancing problem for purely elective abortions.'53
 Clearly, the state's interest in encouraging normal childbirth is not rele-
 vant when it can be ascertained that the fetus may be born with serious de-
 formities. In such a case, the potential life which the state seeks to protect
 would not be normal, and the state therefore has no interest that it can inter-
 pose against the statutory health interest.
 A much closer question arises when the pregnancy greatly jeopardizes
 or harms the health of the woman.'54 The state's interest in protecting po-
 tential normal life must be balanced with the statutory health interest, which,
 in this context should be viewed as an interest in protecting the normal
 healthy life of the woman. Where the threat to the woman's health is clear
 151. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 453 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Doe v. Beal,
 523 F.2d 611, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1975).
 152. 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
 153. It is important to note that the problem of restrictions on non-elective abortions
 remains one of balancing interests. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a different
 approach in Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No. 78-1324 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979). Relying upon
 42 C.F.R. ?440.230 (1978) (state may not reduce scope of any service "solely because of
 the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition"), the court held that it was unreasonable and
 inconsistent with the objectives of Medicaid for a state to single out the condition of medically
 complicated pregnancies "and restrict treatment for that condition to life and death situa-
 tions. . . . [Olne would be hard put to discern any rational social objective being thereby
 served." Slip op. at 10. This analysis, however, ignores the state's interest in protecting
 potential life-present only in the context of abortion funding-which does provide a rational
 basis for distinguishing pregnancy from other medical conditions. The critical question thus
 remains whether this state interest in potential life outweighs the statutory health interest.
 154. There are many physical conditions that cause serious health threats during
 pregnancy-while not, in the view of most doctors, threatening life-such as phlebitis, varicose
 veins, cancer, diabetes, anemia, and urinary tract infections. See ACLU, THE IMPACT OF
 THE HYDE AMENDMENT ON MEDICALLY NECESSARY ABORTIONS 25-30 (Oct. 1978).
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 and certain, the statutory health interest would appear to outweigh the state's
 contingent interest in potential life.'55 Consequently, abortion funding re-
 strictions that allow no discretion to cover health threatening situations are
 not reasonable, absent overriding state fiscal concerns.
 The question arises, however, whether this statutory analysis must be
 altered in light of the so-called Hyde Amendment, which currently restricts
 federal Medicaid reimbursement for abortions. This rider to the annual
 Labor-HEW appropriations act authorizes federal expenditures for abortions
 only when the pregnancy results from rape or incest, or when continuing the
 pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or result in severe and long-
 lasting physical health damage.'56 Several states have adopted abortion
 funding laws that incorporate this standard.'57 While it is somewhat broader
 than a life-endangering standard, on its face the Hyde Amendment standard
 is still too restrictive to be compatible with the statutory health interest em-
 bodied in the Medical scheme-it covers neither threats to mental health
 nor the many various physical health threats 158 that, although serious, will
 not produce "long-lasting damage." 1'9 Consequently, state abortion funding
 laws that adopt the Hyde Amendment standard--and a fortiori state statutes
 employing a life-endangering standard-are unreasonable and thus invalid,
 unless the Hyde Amendment has substantively altered the states' obligations
 under title XIX.
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explored this latter question
 in Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis.'60 After examining the legislative history-
 155. While the cases provide no direct guidance as to the balance to be struck, Roe v. Wade,
 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is instructive on this point. In determining the extent to which states
 could constitutionally restrict any abortions, the Court indicated that throughout most of the
 term of pregnancy the interest in maternal health clearly outweighs the state's interest in
 protecting potential life. The interest in potential life does not become "compelling" until
 the final trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163. Throughout the term of pregnancy, however,
 concern for the existing life of the woman outweighs concern for the contingent, potential life
 of the fetus, for even during the third trimester a state may not completely proscribe abortion
 "when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164.
 156. The current version of the Hyde Amendment, Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No.
 95-205, ? 101, 91 Stat. 1460, provides:
 That none of the funds provided for in this [act] shall be used to perform
 abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
 were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims
 of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law
 enforcement agency or public health service; or except in those instances where
 severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the
 pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians.
 The constitutionality of this law is currently being challenged. McRae v. Mathews, 421
 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433
 U.S. 916 (1977).
 157. Thirteen states have adopted the Hyde Amendment funding standard. See ACLU,
 supra note 154, at 1-2 app.
 158. See note 154 supra.
 159. The First Circuit, stressing the exclusion of funding in cases where mental health
 is threatened, has similarly concluded that the Hyde Amendment standard is inconsistent
 with the objectives of title XIX. See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No. 78-1324, slip op. at
 21-22 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
 160. No. 78-1324 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
 Several district courts have commented on the Amendment's impact on the requirements
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 which consists solely of emotional floor debates-the court concluded that
 Congress intended the Amendment to be substantive legislation, even though
 it was part of an appropriations act.161 The abortion funding standard of the
 Amendment was held to be inconsistent with title XIX because, by excluding
 coverage of cases where mental health is threatened, it unreasonably dis-
 criminates on the basis of diagnosis or condition.'62 The only way to recon-
 cile this conflict, the court reasoned, was to treat the Hyde Amendment as
 an implied repealer of a state's obligation under title XIX to fund a broader
 range of medically necessary abortions. While recognizing that repeals by
 implication-particularly when achieved through appropriations acts-are
 strongly disfavored,'63 the court found such a reading of the Amendment to
 be less objectionable than one that would require states to fund abortions
 without federal reimbursement, thereby violating the "cooperative federalism"
 structure of Medicaid. The court argued that a failure to treat the Hyde
 Amendment as a substantive alteration of the Medicaid Act would impose
 ''massive financial burdens" on the state-burdens that would cripple "the
 functioning of its entire [Medicaid] plan." 164
 Upon close examination, the congressional debates on the Hyde Amend-
 ment do not support the First Circuit's conclusion that all members "of
 Congress were acutely aware that they were engaging in substantive legisla-
 tion." 165 In fact, it was only opponents of the legislation who characterized
 it as substantive legislation.'66 Supporters of the measure stressed that it was
 only an appropriations bill, and thus merely an exercise of Congress's power
 to authorize or withhold federal funds.'67 The First Circuit relied upon state-
 ments such as Representative Stokes' remark that the Amendment was "tan-
 tamount to a constitutional amendment outlawing abortions for the poor" 16S
 to conclude that Congress intended to alter state obligations. Once again, it
 was opponents who suggested such an effect.'69 The sponsors and suporters
 of the Amendment carefully pointed out that it would "simply den[y] federal
 funds" for abortions.'70
 of title XIX. Compare Zbaraz v. Quern, [1978 Tranfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
 (CCH) ? 29,001 (N.D. Ill. 1978), and Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D.N.J.
 1976) (holding that the Hyde Amendment has no impact on the state's obligations under
 title XIX), with McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and
 remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977) (Hyde Amendment is calculated
 to stop state funding for abortions as well).
 161. Slip op. at 15-19.
 162. Id. at 20-22.
 163. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978).
 164. Slip op. at 19.
 165. Id. at 15.
 166. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S11,035 (daily ed. July 29, 1977) (remarks by Sen.
 Brooke); id. at S19,440 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
 167. See, e.g., id. at H6086-88 (daily ed. June 17, 1977) (remarks of Reps. Doran
 and Rudd).
 168. Slip op. at 18 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. H6085 (daily ed. June 17, 1977)).
 169. Remarks similar to those of Rep. Stokes appear at 123 CONG. REc. H6092 (Rep.
 Holtzman), H6097 (Rep. Meyner) (daily ed. June 17, 1977); id. at S11,031 (Sen Packwood),
 S11,040 (Sen. McGovern), S11,043 (Sen. Bayh) (daily ed. June 29, 1977).
 170. Id. at H6086 (daily ed. June 17, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Doran). See also id. at
 H10,826-30 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977) (remarks of Reps. Hyde and Flood).
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 All that the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment demonstrates
 conclusively is the danger of relying solely upon floor debates to determine
 legislative intent. Since the Hyde Amendment debate was extremely emo-
 tional, appeals and characterizations made by its opponents are particularly
 unreliable indicators of intent. The most important observation that can be
 gleaned from the debates is that few, if any, members of Congress were
 thinking about the Amendment's implications for the Medicaid Act.'7' In
 fact, there are no express statements concerning the Amendment's impact-
 either in imposing funding requirements or allowing funding restrictions-
 on the states. In light of this confused and unreliable legislative history, the
 principle that appropriations measures are not to be read as implied re-
 pealers 172 should apply with full force. Consequently, the language of the
 Hyde Amendment should be taken at face value-it affects no more than
 federal funds.
 In concluding that the Hyde Amendment had substantively altered
 title XIX, the First Circuit relied upon the fact that a contrary result would
 require states to bear the full cost of some abortions, thus violating the
 principle of cooperative federalism.'73 This argument is misconceived. Con-
 gress's purpose in establishing the cooperative federalism funding scheme was
 to encourage states to participate in the program by easing the fiscal burden
 that such participation would place upon the states.'74 But even when a state
 bears the full cost of a medically necessary abortion, it still pays less than
 what would be its share of a federally reimbursed childbirth.'75 Thus, the
 interest of cost savings-which was the original purpose of the cooperative
 federalism principle-is still best served when the state funds the abortion.
 Consequently, the substance of the cooperative federalism principle, as op-
 posed to its form, does not support the First Circuit's reading of the Hyde
 Amendment.
 Since the Hyde Amendment does not substantively alter a state's obliga-
 tions under title XIX, the only remaining question is whether state fiscal
 concerns justify the restrictions embodied in either the life-endangering or
 Hyde Amendment standards. In fact, states do not have valid fiscal reasons
 for adopting such standards, because abortions are far less costly for the
 state than the alternative of childbirth, which involves expensive pre-natal
 and post-partum care in addition to the costs of delivery.'76 This is true even
 when the state must bear the full cost of an abortion.'77 Since these restric-
 171. Dissenting in Preterm, Judge Bownes noted that "Congress was so emotionally en-
 veloped in this volatile and disruptive subject that it failed to think through the implications
 of what it was doing." Slip op. at 31 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
 172. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978).
 173. See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, No. 78-1324, slip. op. at 22-23 (1st Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
 174. See 1965 S. REP., supra note 2, at 73-74.
 175. See note 177 and accompanying text infra.
 176. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977).
 177. New Jersey, for example, has estimated that enforcement of its restrictive abortion
 funding law has cost the state $3.5 million in increased costs for childbirth and welfare sup-
 port. Winer & Haines, Courts Clash over Abortion Rider, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 5, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
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 tive standards cannot be justified on fiscal grounds, the statutory health
 interest should therefore prevail. Consequently, both state restrictions that
 limit funding to those abortions required to save the woman's life, and those
 that adopt the Hyde Amendment standard, are unreasonable and thus
 invalid under the Medicaid Act.
 CONCLUSION
 Because the Medicaid program is an exercise in cooperative federalism,
 participating states retain broad discretion to shape and alter their coverage
 plans, subject only to vague federal requirements of reasonableness. Title
 XIX contains no express indication that states must fund all medically neces-
 sary services. Instead, the statute requires only that limitations on funding
 for such services be reasonable. Since it supplies no general formula for
 evaluating reasonableness, the validity of state funding restrictions can only
 be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. The determination must rest on a
 careful balancing of the statutory interest in protecting health and the state's
 interests-usually fiscal-in imposing the limitation.
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